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Competition is claimed to be beneficial in development projects promoting micro and small 
enterprise finance although there are still some doubts whether these loans can be developed 
into a profitable business. Actually nothing is known about how many MSE banking units 
optimally should be created and supported in a certain region. Our research aims at shedding 
new light on this important issue in development finance. We employ a unique dataset from 
the Small Business Department of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
for Kazakhstan, and investigate which strategy contributes more to the overall program’s 
success:  a strategy of building up several competing banking units targeted at MSE lending 
or a strategy of establishing regional monopolies.  
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“Competition is the most important principle on which our strategy is 
based. As in any other market, effective competition provides 
incentives for banks to offer market based and demand-oriented 
financial services. Competition encourages the development of better 
products and services at lower cost.” (Matthäus-Maier/von Pischke 
2004, p. 1) 
 
1  Introduction 
Development politics considers creating financial institutions targeted at the supply of 
financial services to lower income households, particularly at the supply of loans to micro and 
small entrepreneurs (MSE) as one of the most powerful tools for fighting poverty and for 
speeding up growth in developing and transition countries (Morduch 1999, Robinson 2001). 
For more than a decade, public and private donor agencies have been spending millions of 
dollars every year to support the microfinance approach. Hundreds of new microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) were founded all over the world. In some areas with a high density of 
micro and small entrepreneurs where not long ago the lack of access to finance had been 
considered a main impediment to development and accordingly donors became active, the 
microfinance markets are crowded by now. Not only informal money lenders compete with 
semiformal or formal MFIs, but different MFIs compete for serving the same client group 
(Rhyne/Christen 1999, Chaudhury/Matin 2002). 
Whether increased competition should always be welcomed, however, is far from being clear. 
Politicians, bank practicians as well as members of the economic scientific community claim 
that competition in banking may have negative impacts on both, the financial stability of a 
single bank and the stability of the banking system as a whole 
(Franklin/Gersbach/Krahnen/Santomero 2001). If potential virtues and vices of rising 
competition in financial markets, last not least caused by internationalization and 
globalization, are a subject of controversial discussion in developed countries, there should be 
even more caution with respect to competition in the microfinance markets of developing or 
transition countries. After all, the market segment of microfinance has not been shaped purely 
by commercial forces. It rather have been subsidies which supported the creation of this 
market and influenced the degree of competition.  
  2Our paper wants to shed new light on the yet unsolved question of whether competition is 
good or bad in microfinance markets. The microfinance approach follows a dual mission: 
outreach to the target group of MSE and financial sustainability of the supplying institution. 
The latter provides the guarantee that the new business will survive in the market once the 
donors’ support is faded out. To investigate how these two dimensions of project success are 
affected by competition, we analyse a unique set of microdata on MSE lenders in Kazakhstan. 
The data was collected by the Kazakhstan Small Business Programme (KSBP), a 
microfinance program supported by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) (Terberger/Lepp 2004). The set up of the KSBP and, accordingly, the nature of the 
data, seem ideal to follow our research question because the creation of competition was not 
only an implicit, but an explicit part of the program’s strategy.  
The creation of competition as an integral strategy component is not a unique feature of 
KSBP. It is typical for any microfinance program following the so called downscaling 
approach. In distinction to donors’ support for a non-profit organisation serving microclients 
to become a professional MFI (upscaling), development aid is used in downscaling to give 
incentives for commercial banks to move down the market and start a loan business for micro 
and small enterprise. Typically, a downscaling project is designed as follows: In a first step, 
several partner banks are selected who show a serious interest in receiving support for the 
foundation of microloan departments. In a second step, partner banks receive subsidies to 
cover the start up cost of their new business line. Usually the subsidies are provided in the 
form of technical assistance for selecting, training and paying special micro loan officers and 
establishing the administrative structures and procedures of the new loan departments. When 
the new business starts, its revenues go towards the coverage of its costs with the ultimate aim 
that revenues exceed costs, the partner banks make profits and will stick to their new business 
on their own behalf when the donor withdraws. 
Being a partner bank in such a program means competing with other partner banks for the 
same clients right from the beginning if more than one partner bank is located in the same 
regional market. For this feature of the program design, downscaling projects are a ‘living 
proof’ of donors’ belief in the virtues of competition. Downscaling serves as a kind of 
‘controlled field experiment’ ideally suitable to study the effects of competition on the dual 
mission of the microfinance approach empirically.  
Therefore, our results offer new insights into the problem of optimal policy design. By and 
large we find that competition is an impediment to the SME-branches’ profitability but does 
not necessarely endanger their financial sustainability. The results concerning outreach are 
  3ambiguous. While the volumes disbursed by each banking unit grow with competition, 
competition shows no effect on the number of new loans. Average loan size as the proxy for 
target group orientation goes up with competition, indicating that competition may force 
banking units towards serving wealthier clients.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief review of the related 
literature.  In section 3 we develop the hypotheses to be tested. Details about KSBP’s history, 
the data set and the applied testing methods are provided in section 4. Section 5 contains the 
presentation and discussion of results. Section 6 concludes and points to open questions for 
further research. 
2  Review of Related Literature 
Since the beginning of the 1990ies numerous papers pointed out that competition in banking 
might show different effects than those predicted by the neoclassical equilibrium analysis 
(Cetorelli 2001). Due to the special characteristics of the banking business, which can only be 
explained in a setting of incomplete and imperfect markets, competition might not be a purely 
positive phenomenon driving prices down and enhancing efficiency. Competition may cause 
unwanted effects like suboptimal levels of screening, winner’s curse problems, excessive risk 
taking or even the break down of the market which need to be counteracted by institutions 
like supervisory regulations to secure the financial stability of the banking sector. Closely 
related to our research question are those papers which analyse competition in the context of 
relationship lending. This lending technique is considered the most appropriate for lending to 
young firms and micro and small entrepreneurs, even more so in less developed financial 
markets with little public information on potential clients and low legal enforcement of 
creditor rights (Rajan/Zingales 1998). As relationship lending can only be applied if the 
lender has some monopolistic power (Rajan 1992), relationship lending might be undermined 
by competition (Petersen/Rajan 1995). Accordingly, micro and small firms might find it more 
difficult to get access to loan finance if the banking market is characterized by high 
competition - a hypothesis which was first confirmed in empirical analyses based on data of 
the U.S. banking market (Berger/Udell 1994; Petersen/Rajan 1995) and later on for other 
countries. 
Although in development projects trying to promote MSE finance the relationship lending 
technique is regularly applied and although there exists a vast literature on microfinance, there 
are very few papers addressing the question of competition. The phenomenon of competition 
simply was not considered relevant for microfinance projects. After all, these projects were 
  4trying to promote a service which formal players of the financial market would not supply out 
of their own business interest. Accordingly, the main focus was on the problem of making the 
supply of MSE loans a viable business. The first paper to point out that competition has 
reached the microfinance market and will be important for the future of the microfinance 
approach is Rhyne and Christen (1999).
1 The paper is based on a case study of microfinance 
in Bolivia, which is one of the furthest developed microfinance markets in the world.
2 Rhyne 
and Christen point to the dangers, which the entrance of commercial players into the 
microfinance market carries for the financial sustainability of incumbent non-profit players. 
This view is theoretically backed by Hoff/Stiglitz (1998). Inspired by development projects 
trying to extend the supply of microloans in informal markets by offering cheap formal 
refinancing sources to moneylenders (interlinkage approach), Hoff and Stiglitz provide 
arguments against the beneficial effects of competition. They show that economists’ intuition 
which “suggests that a fall in the costs of funds to any group in a money market should lower 
the cost of credit to all through general equilibrium effects” (Hoff/Stiglitz 1998, p. 488) might 
be misleading if government subsidies lowering the cost of (informal) for-profit 
moneylenders are concerned. The argument rests on the new entry, which is attracted by 
subsidies because it may undermine the endogenous disciplining and monitoring 
technologies, which a provider of microfinance as a typical relationship lender has to rely on. 
New entry has an adverse effect on contract enforcement cost if the repayment discipline of 
microclients declines due to their lower cost of switching to an alternative lender. Under such 
circumstances the threat of cutting off a defaulting client from future credit supply, which is 
an important disciplining device for relationship lenders under monopolistic competition, 
cannot be applied effectively anymore. Similar effects arise if new entry prevents the 
exploitation of economies of scale or induces microclients to borrow from multiple sources. 
These effects of rising competition can be so strong that the intended effect of government 
subsidies to provide better access to finance for MSE may even be reversed. 
The Hoff/Stiglitz paper directs its arguments against the interlinkage approach and even 
concludes that supporting MFIs in the formal sector is the superior microfinance approach 
(Hoff/Stiglitz 1998, p. 513). Nevertheless, their arguments against competition still hold for 
                                                           
1 The paper was presented 1998 at a conference on Microfinance for practicians and academics by Elizabeth 
Rhyne, one of the most prominent figures in the microfinance industry holding the position of a vice president in 
ACCION International, a big private consultancy firm specialised on development finance.   
2 Donors started to support microfinance in Bolivia already in the end of the 1980ies building up several MFIs, 
underneath them BancoSol and Caja los Andes who belong to the flagship institutions of the microfinance 
movement by now (Rhyne 2001). 
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entries. Other theoretical papers have followed which highlight possible negative effects of 
competition in the microfinance market. Ghosh and Ray (2001) analyze competition between 
for-profit relationship lenders, showing that competition might destroy repayment incentives 
and lead to market break down unless lenders react by credit rationing to threat bad borrowers 
off. Uhlig and Gersbach (2004) show, for the banking market in general, that rationing will 
not be a stable equilibrium as lenders can compete in being more and more strict in their 
rationing policy. The paper by McIntosh and Wydick (2003) is taking up again – much in line 
with Hoff/Stiglitz - the subject of competition in the subsidized microfinance market leading 
to new entry. They show that multiple source lending might lead to greater defaults due to 
overindebtedness, that competition might prevent MFIs to fulfill their mission of lending to 
the poor as cross subsidizing between more wealthy and poorer customers becomes 
impossible. Subsidization might even deter commercial lenders to enter the MSE market.  
There do exist theoretical papers, however, which argue that an adequate institutional 
framework might overcome adverse effects of competition in the MSE loan market. Several 
papers, underneath them Padilla and Pagano (2000) analyze, again for the banking market in 
general, how information sharing between competing lenders can help to restore payment 
discipline. Actually, information sharing was already mentioned in the Bolivian case study 
based paper by Rhyne/Christen (1999) as a device against strategic borrower default in 
microfinance markets. Navajas, Conning and Gonzalez-Vega (2003) show, inspired by the 
Bolivian microfinance market as well, that competing MFIs can survive if they can 
concentrate on different customer groups and  apply different lending technologies.
3  
No doubt, the message of the theoretical literature on competition and microfinance is 
ambiguous. Thus the question whether competition in microfinance is generally good or bad 
has to be answered empirically. However, papers systematically analyzing data on 
competition and microfinance are rare. The study of Vogelgesang (2003) analyzes the effects 
of competition on repayment behaviour by using a data set on the loan portfolio of Caja los 
Andes, one of the Bolivian MFIs. She finds that borrowing from multiple sources and loan 
default have increased with competition. At the same time, however, repayment discipline of 
those customers with unaffected borrowing behaviour increased.  
McIntosh/Janvry/Sadoulet 2003 study  the effects of competition on borrower behaviour for 
Uganda. Similar to the Bolivian situation, they find that multi source borrowing is going 
                                                           
3 Navajas, Conning and Gonzales-Vega (2003) find some empirical evidence for their model results in the data 
of two big competing MFIs in Bolivia, BancoSol and Caja los Andes. 
  6along with a decline of repayment discipline. However, overall they conclude a positive effect 
of competition.  The negative impact on repayment behaviour did not undermine the financial 
stability of the institutions while competition contributed positively to outreach and financial 
deepening. Chaudhury/Matin 2002 find similar results for the “crowded” microfinance market 
in Bangladesh. Multiple source lending and borrower overindebtedness are “being managed 
from turning into a major default problem” (Chaudhury/Matin 2002:  46).  
The empirical studies have got in common that they rely on a data set which is provided by 
one institution. Moreover, competitive effects are analyzed indirectly by information about 
multi source borrowing of the institutions’ clients and –  in the case of Uganda – information 
about the number of local competitors. Navajas et al (2003) study a data set supplied by two 
competing MFIs but concentrate on the question of how competition affects the lending 
technologies applied and the behaviour of borrowers leading to market segmentation. To our 
knowledge, no empirical study has tackled the question of how competition influences the 
outreach and the financial situation of MFIs directly yet. Due to our unique set of microdata 
on the credit portfolio as well as on cost and revenues of competing microloan departments in 
Kazakhstan,  we are able to provide answers to this question. 
3  Impact of Competition: Hypotheses 
Our study aims at offering empirical insights, which could enhance the efficiency of 
development strategies promoting MSE loan finance by the financial institution building 
approach. Specifically we are interested in the question whether competition is conducive to 
the program’s success. 
Consequently we develop our hypotheses according to the dual mission followed by these 
projects in general and the KSBP in particular: financial sustainability in the form of cost 
coverage or even profitability of the loan supplier and – assuming that the budget or the level 
of financial sustainability is given - maximal outreach to the target group. 
For the financial sustainability dimension the majority of the theoretical literature predicts a 
negative effect of competition on profits although this does not always imply a rise in welfare. 
Profitability is not equivalent to financial sustainability, however. It is a necessary 
precondition for the sustainability of the MSE loan business. Without reaching the brink of 
profitability, loan suppliers can or will not stick to the business unless they are provided with 
further subsidies. Therefore, profitability is an important indicator not only for financial 
sustainability but also for subsidy requirements. Accordingly, the first hypothesis to be tested 
is: 
  7Hypothesis 1: The number of competing banks offering micro and small business loans 
in a location negatively affects profitability. 
We test Hypothesis 1 by employing different indicators for profitability. 
Outreach to the target group has several dimensions in itself. Outreach could be measured as 
the volume of the MSE-loan portfolio, it could be measured in client numbers, and it could 
also be interpreted in the sense of reaching the target group of low-income clientele. Although 
the literature even argues that competition might lead to a fall in the overall supply of MSE 
loans this hypothesis would not make sense in our context where first entries into a formerly 
unserved market are promoted. The number of banking units offering MSE loans should have 
a positive impact on total outreach purely by size effects. It seems appropriate, however, to 
predict that the number of competitors has a negative effect on the outreach of every single 
branch in that region because competition makes it more difficult for every single bank to 
extend the new business. This leads us to predict: 
Hypothesis 2: The outreach of a single MSE banking unit decreases with the number of 
competing MSE-banks operating in a location. 
We test Hypothesis 2 by employing different indicators trying to capture the different 
dimensions of outreach mentioned above. 
4  Empirical Evidence  
4.1  The EBRD Downscaling Program in Kazakhstan
4 
Kazakhstan belongs to the group of the most advanced CIS states concerning transformation 
and economic development because the government firmly committed to follow a policy of 
liberalization, privatization and structural reform as early as 1993/94. Positive growth-rates, 
except in the aftermath of the Russian financial crisis, an almost balanced state budget and a 
successful fight against inflation have characterized the Kazakh macroeconomic situation for 
the past few years. 
Kazakhstan is rich in natural resources, especially in oil and gas, which on the one hand is an 
important source of income and attracts foreign investment; on the other hand it causes a 
dependence of the Kazakh economy on the world’s oil and gas market. The need for more 
diversification in the economy was one of the reasons for the government’s early commitment 
                                                           
4 This paragraph draws on Lepp/Terberger 2004. 
  8to promote small and medium enterprise development, which was reflected in several legal 
acts and in the request for the KSBP microfinance program.  
Reforms in the financial sector had far advanced when the microfinance program took up its 
activity in 1998. Interest rate ceilings and directed policy lending had been abandoned, a two 
tier banking system had been established as early as 1993, and the government pushed the 
process of privatization with the last commercial bank being privatized in 2001. Moreover a 
well functioning banking supervisory authority had been established in the National Bank of 
Kazakhstan. A formal loan market for micro and small enterprise, however, was almost non-
existent. 
KSBP was implemented in April 1998. KSBP’s “principal objectives are (i) to provide 
finance to MSEs, which currently have insufficient access to formal sector finance; (ii) to 
build up the credit capabilities of Kazakhstan's financial sector so that local banks are able to 
provide MSEs with access to finance on a permanent basis” (EBRD 1997). These objectives 
clearly point out the dual mission of the microfinance approach. According to its objectives, 
KSBP was not designed as a project to directly fight poverty, but as a project of financial 
market development. An impact on poverty reduction is expected in an indirect way by 
creating sustainable access to formal loan finance for small and micro entrepreneurs. 
KSBP was provided with a sovereign guaranteed EBRD credit line of 77.6 Mio. USD as a 
refinancing facility for the MSE business of the partner banks. The conditions, however, made 
these funds not much more attractive than funds partner banks could borrow on the market. 
Some partner banks even had access to cheaper refinancing facilities. The main financial 
incentive for partner banks to participate was the donors’ support of the organizational 
implementation of the new business for which the Kazakh government, EBRD and several 
other donor organizations provided a considerable sum
5. 
Five partner banks had been selected beforehand which could meet the qualification criteria
6, 
underneath them some of the largest Kazakh commercial banks. Four of these banks were in 
private ownership. The fifth bank was fully privatized in 2001. Two more private banks 
joined the program in November 1998 and in September 1999 respectively. 
                                                           
5 Among them EBRD, USAID and TACIS. 
6 The qualification criteria consisted of a full banking license, approval by the NBK, IAS-Audit, program 
compatible strategy and commitment of bank-management to gain experience in MSE business, location of 
geographical interest as well as financial stability according to banking regulation standards. 
  9Competition was implemented by KSBP right from the beginning. All competitors had 
standardized starting conditions and offered the same standardized products. Furthermore, 
KSBP standardized the implementation of the organizational structure of the new loan 
departments within each bank.
7  By early 2004 all urban centers in Kazakhstan were covered 
by the program. The outstanding MSE-portfolio grew to over 162 Mio. USD in volume and 
over 35.000 in number, and growth rates were still high. “So far, the program has greatly 
outperformed expectations and serves as a model for expanding the outreach of commercial 
banks to poorer enterprises.” (Worldbank 2004) 
In 2003 KSBP started to establish a profit center calculation for the MSE business in each 
partner bank. The first reliable profit center data came out in late 2003. Therefore, the chance 
to analyze panel data right from the start of the program is foregone. Nevertheless, the data 
which were made available are unique and will allow a cross sectional analysis of the field 
experiment on competition and microfinance in Kazakhstan.  
                                                          
4.2  Dataset and Variables 
The data for our analysis come from several sources. Most importantly we have cost and 
revenue information of the MSE loan departments of five out of seven banks participating in 
KSBP. The information comprises a cross-sectional survey of the loan departments for the 
first quarter of 2004. In addition to cost-revenue figures the survey contains information on 
the opening and, if applicable, the closing date for every reporting department, the name of 
the bank that established it and the city/town
8 where the banks’ branch opening up the MSE 
department is located. By the end of 2003 the seven participating banks had established MSE-
departments in 126 branches. As the MSE departments operate as separate profit centres 
within each branch, we will refer to the MSE departments just as MSE branches or branches 
in the following. Figure 1 shows the number of MSE branches per bank. The cost-revenue 
information  in our data set covers all branches except those 12 branches, which belong to the 
two non-reporting banks (bank type 6 and 7).  
In addition to branches the participating banks settle non-autonomous MSE banking units, so-
called outlets that are attached to parent MSE branches to whom they report their results. Data 
about outlets come from a second dataset that includes opening and – should the situation 
 
7 The standardization includes the introduction of an IT-based Management Information System (MIS), the 
MSE-lending guidelines and the introduction of an incentive based payment scheme for loan officers, which 
covered all aspects of their performance from disbursement to portfolio quality. 
8 In the following sections we use city and town interchangeably. 
  10arise - closing dates of all banking units (branches and outlets) for each participating bank 
sorted by region. Besides the name of the region the data set names the location each banking 
unit is operating in as well as the number of citizens as a proxy for the size of the market. 
Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of the 126 branches over the regions. The 16 regions’ 
names are taken from the central KSBP-statistics.  
 
 




















































  114.3  Independent Variables 
The number of banks present in every single town/city at the beginning of 2004 reveals the 
state of competition. Each distinct bank present in a certain location is taken as one 
competitor. Thus the number of competitors (NumberC) ranges from one to seven (number 
of participating banks). If one bank owns more than one branch or outlet in a city all branches 
and outlets belonging to the same bank are counted as one competitor.
 In very few cities some 
banks are running only outlets. Nevertheless, the bank is present as a competitor in this 
location and therefore is counted as such.  
Parent MSE branch and reporting outlets may be located in different towns. This could cause 
distortions of cost-revenue figures of parent branches with respect to the impact of 
competition. For example, if the parent branch’s figures contain the results of an outlet that is 
a monopolist in its location, the effect of competition in the parent branch’s own city is hardly 
reflected by these figures. To account for such distortions we would have had to remove 
parent branches from our data set, if parent branch and corresponding outlet face different 
competitive pressure. Luckily, however, the sample contains only outlets  that face the same 
competitive environment as their parent branch even if both are located in different towns. 
Thus we keep the information on all parent branches in the sample. The competitive 
environment in which the KSBP-MSE-branches operate is shown in Figure 3. Most 
frequently two or three distinct banks operate in the same city.  
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The degree of competition may not only depend on the number of competitors but also on the 
proximity of clients to the next banking unit (Degryse/Ongena 2005) and market size. As we 
are lacking information on the local distribution of banking units we try to control for these 
issues by employing a density measure. The density of MSE-banking units (LDensity) is 
defined as the number of inhabitants of the town divided by the sum of branches and outlets 
in that location. 
To control for other effects than the one of multiple entrance into the local microlending 
market we employ several control variables. Most importantly, we expect that the age of each 
banking unit or rather the time it has been in operation (Age) influences its performance due 
to economies of scale. Since as a bank branch gets older the marginal effect of time it has 
been in operation is likely to change, we have inlcuded the age squared (AgeSqr) variable 
that induces differentiated marginal effects of the Age variable on the dependent variables in 
question.  
 The portfolio volume of most branches is growing over time while certain fixed costs remain 
constant. Furthermore, experience leads to greater professionalism of the loan officers and 
thus could have a positive impact on results – to name just a few reasons for the likely impact 
of ‘age’. The age distribution in the complete sample is shown in Figure 4. To control for the 
different structure of administrative cost,  the size of each branch defined by the number of 
loan officers (Size) is included into the econometric model. Figure 5 reflects the complete 
sample’s size distribution. Class 1 contains all branches with one or zero loan officers. Class 9 
includes all branches, which employ more than 8 loan officers. The remaining classes 
correspond to the respective number of loan officers given on the horizontal axis.  
A bank-type dummy variable (Type) ranging from one to seven is included to capture the 
specific influences coming from the mother bank, such as business style, popularity of the 
brand name, corporate governance or refinancing situation. We do not have access to region-
specific socio-economic information for the year 2003 and 2004. In order to capture economic 
differences between the 16 regions we employ a region dummy (Region).   
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  144.4  Impact of Competition – Dependent Variables and Testing 
Methods 
The initial cost-revenue file contains data on 126 banking units that have been brought into 
action before 2004. However, the financial data are missing for all branches of bank type 6 
and 7 (12 branches). This leaves us with 114 observations. Since the very young MSE 
branches (defined as those that are from 1 to 3 months old) need a start-up period in order to 
collect a loan portfolio, we have also expelled these branches from the estimation sample, 
which leaves us with 111 branches. Furthermore, we have excluded from the analysis two 
branches that report zero loan officers, and two branches that report negative returns (in order 
to avoid taking logs from negative numbers). As a result, we are left with 107 observations.  
We analyze the influence of competition on the dual mission of the microfinance approach.  
For measuring profitability we employ several indicators. The revenue side of profitability is 
represented by the interest income per unit of the outstanding MSE portfolio 
(InterestIncome) whereas expenses for personnel (CostPersonnel) and total administrative 
cost of the MSE departments (CostAdmin) reflect the cost side. As refinancing costs are not 
under the control of the MSE departments but are rather determined by the other business of 
the mother bank, we do not analyze these costs separately. To combine the cost and revenue 
sides and measure profitability more directly we use two indicators: first, the rate of return on 
the MSE loan portfolio as the return on asset (RoA) since the loan portfolio is the only asset 
which can be exclusively assigned to the micro loan department and, second, the return per 
loan officer ( OfficerProfitability). Both profitability measures seem especially important 
because financial funds allocated to the MSE loan portfolio as well as trained personnel 
represent the scarce resources tied up in the MSE loan business. These resources can be 
expected to be transferred to other business if the MSE business does not pay off. Finally, 
since profitability is also affected by bad loans, we use the arrears rate (Arrears) as a direct 
indicator of portfolio quality and an indirect indicator of profitability.  
For measuring outreach we focus on turnover-related indicators such as the volume and the 
number of loans disbursed per loan officer during the first quarter of 2004 
(VolumeDisbdSize, NumberDisbdSize). We chose these flow related measures instead of 
measures representing the stock  of the accumulated portfolio because the competitive 
situation changed while the stock of loans was built up. Therefore, measures of the new 
business in the first quarter of 2004 can be expected to give the best reflection of the actual 
competitive situation. Furthermore,  we  employ the average loan size (ALoanSize)  as a 
  15measure of outreach. The latter is likely to reflect the degree to which a branch is dedicated to 
the target group of low-income clientele. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the 
selected indicators. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
            
Dependent 
Variables 











Interest income divided by 
average outstanding 
portfolio* 




Wages and salaries divided 
by average outstanding 
portfolio* 





Total administrative costs 
divided by average 
outstanding portfolio* 




Department profit before tax 
divided by average 
outstanding portfolio* 
107 2.7753  0.98572  0.15000  6.6900 
OfficerProfitability 
(in US-Dollar) 
Regression 5  
Department profit before  tax 
per loan officer 




Arrears divided by  
average outstanding 
portfolio* 





Loan volume disbursed in 
quarter 1 of 2004 per loan 
officer 




Number of loans disbursed in 
quarter 1 of 2004 per loan 
officer 








Total volume of loans 
disbursed in quarter 1 of 
2004 divided by number of 
loans disbursed during the 
period 
107 5386.3  3147.4  1407.5  16427 
 
    * All figures were multiplied by a hundred. 
+  One branch reports zero administrative costs. This branch is excluded from the sample when 
regressing   the administrative costs on the number of competitors and the controls. 
° The summary statistics refer to the 27 branches which report arrears. 
 
The dependent variables InterestIncome, CostPersonnel, CostAdmin, OfficerProfitability, 
VolumeDisbdSize, NumberDisbdSize, AloanSize have been log transformed in the 
regressions. All of the regressions except the regression for arrears (regression 6) have been 
estimated by the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. The OLS-regression adequacy has 
been checked by the following tests available as the standard regression diagnostic tests in 
PcGive 10.4 (see Doornik and Hendry  2001): Doornik-Hansen (1994) test for residual 
normality, White (1980) test of no residual heteroscedasticity, and Ramsey (1969) RESET 
regression misspecification test.  
  16There appear to be a certain number of outliers in some of the regressions. As a result, some 
of the diagnostic tests reported that the underlying model assumptions have been violated. 
These outliers have been dummied out such that the assumption of the residual normality 
remained fulfilled. However, it is important to note that inclusion or exclusion of these 
dummy variables in our regression have no practical influence on the conclusions.  
For estimating the impact of competition on the arrears we could not apply the OLS-method. 
Since most of the banks in our sample (80 out of 107) report no arrears at all, we have 
choosen to assess the impact of competition on the likelihood that a particular bank has 
arrears by means of a logit regression, where the dependent variable is a constructed indicator 
variable that takes value of one when a bank has arrears and value of zero otherwise.  
We test various specifications for all regressions given in Table 1 that differ in the amount of 
control variables included (see Appendix). For reasons of clarity we report in the following 
section only the specification that includes the complete set of control variables plus the 
significant type and region dummies (see Table 2). 
5  Presentation and Discussion of Results 
Table 2 presents the estimation results on the link between competition and measures of 
profitability and outreach. The first regression indicates that the number of competitors 
decreases the gross interest rate (InterestIncome) an MSE branch earns on the average 
portfolio. The coefficient of NumberC is negative and highly significant while none of the 
control variables – except type and region dummies – show a significant effect. In regression 
2 and 3 neither the margin needed to cover the cost of personnel nor the margin for covering 
total administrative cost shows any significant difference, which can be attributed to the 
number of competing banks, although the coefficient of NumberC is negative in both 
regressions. The control variable Age is negatively significant which points at cost decreasing 
effects from economies of scale and learning.  
The results of the regressions on our profitability indicators, which combine the cost and 
revenue side, complete the picture. When the return on the average outstanding portfolio RoA 
is regressed  on  NumberC  (regression 4) and outliers are controlled for, the number of 
competing banks has a negative impact on RoA with significance on the 1% level. The 
cooefficient of Age is positive and significant at the 5 % level. Almost replicating the 
outcome with respect to the link between InterestIncome and NumberC the results are fairly 
robust.  




    Constant Age  AgeSqr  Ldensity    Size NumberC Dummy  ID Normality Heterosc. RESET Rsqr Par
InterestIncome    Coef. -3.177*** 0.001 0.000 0.036 0.006 -0.033*** 65, 82 [0,5721] [0,4157] [0,4396] 0.536  12 
(Regression 1)  t-ratio  -13.200 0.272 -1.220 1.540 0.887 -4.400             
   p-value  0.000 0.786 0.224 0.128 0.377 0.000              
CostPersonell        Coef. -1.781** -0.030*** 0.000** 0.171** 0.023 -0.021 15 [0,8350] [0,9485] [0,5297] 0.625 10
(Regression 2)  t-ratio  -2.130 -4.570 2.130 2.110 1.250 -0.991             
   p-value  0.036 0.000 0.036 0.037 0.214 0.324              
CostAdmin        Coef. -1.428* -0.038*** 0.000*** 0.173** 0.032* -0.015 [0,5926] [0,4987] [0,2834] 0.680  10
(Regression 3)  t-ratio  -1.890 -6.200 2.760 2.360 1.750 -0.680             
   p-value  0.061 0.000 0.007 0.020 0.083 0.498              
RoA        Coef. -1.483 0.031** 0.000** 0.403** 0.036 -0.138*** 15,62, [0,8874] [0,4963] [0,0611] 0.568 13
(Regression 4)  t-ratio  -0.848 2.150 -2.050 2.370 0.816 -3.000 82,103           
   p-value  0.399 0.034 0.043 0.020 0.416 0.003              
OfficerProfitability      Coef.  6.132*** 0.060*** 0.000*** 0.142 0.043 -0.082** 15,70,103 [0,0879] [0,2162] [0,1625] 0.729 11
(Regression 5)  t-ratio  4.540 5.670 -3.160 1.080 1.470 -2.410             
   p-value 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.281 0.146 0.018              
Arrears               Coef. -8.864 0.143** -0.002** 0.350 0.453** 0.036  
(Regression 6)  t-ratio  -1.190 2.120 -2.100 0.499 2.590 0.199             
 p-value  0.235 0.037 0.038 0.619 0.011 0.843             
Outreach Measures 
VolumeDisbdSize        Coef. 8.950*** 0.028*** 0.000** 0.159*    0.074*** 66,74,100 [0.5195] [0.9156] [0.1535] 0.673 13
(Regression 7)  t-ratio  10.600 4.100 -2.420 1.970    3.180             
   p-value  0.000 0.000 0.017 0.052    0.002              
NumberDisbdSize        Coef.  3.951*** 0.009 0.000 -0.095    -0.019 [0.4688] [0.5213] [0.7614] 0.072 6
(Regression 8)  t-ratio  3.920 1.100 -0.953 -0.981    -0.707             
   p-value  0.000 0.273 0.343 0.329    0.481              
ALoanSize
11        Coef. 7.128*** 0.018** 0.000 0.057 -0.008 0.088*** [0.4018] [0.0041]*** [0.6720] 0.570  11
(Regression 9)  t-ratio  9.166 2.440 -0.548 0.744 -0.403 2.960             
   p-value  0.000 0.015 0.5824 0.4592 0.688 0.003              
                 
 
                                                           
9 The regressions include all control variables and both the type and region dummies. 
10 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
11 The t-ratios and the associated p-values have been calculated using the heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator. 
  18The impact of local competition on OfficerProfitability (regression 5) is also negative and 
significant on the 5%.  OfficerProfitability is an increasing function of age. The coefficient 
is highly significant and robust, hinting just like the regression results on cost measures at 
learning effects. 
In sum Hypothesis 1 is confirmed by the data. As most of the theoretical literature suggests 
profitability, measured in rates of return on scarce financial and human resources, is linked 
negatively to local competition for microlending branches in Kasakhstan. The finding is 
consistent with an empirical result developed in Chang et. al. (1997) for the banking market 
of New York City. They concluded that profits decrease if banks follow other banks’ 
branches. As mentioned before, declining rates of return do not per se endanger financial 
sustainability, however. The donor community might even welcome such a development if 
profits are still high enough to keep the business attractive – a discussion which is picked up 
again later on. 
What we already can conclude, however, is that the negative effect of competition on return 
measures cannot be attributed to a decline in repayment discipline. Although most theoretical 
literature predicts that competition will undermine disciplining devices of relationship 
lending, we do not find any evidence that the quality of the portfolio is affected. The logit 
regression fails to reveal a significant impact of NumberC on the likelihood of arrears 
(regression 6). This result is in contrast to Matin/Chaudhury (2001), McIntosh et. al (2003), 
and Vogelgesang (2003) but is consistent with Park et. al. (2002). The latter argue that in 
presence of credit rationing, competition induces financial institutions to exert greater 
screening and enforcement effort.  
Interpreting our result, it needs to be kept in mind that all of the MSE departments are still 
under the influence of the central consulting service provided by KSBP. The standardized 
screening and monitoring technique implemented by KSBP is a very restrictive one, which 
implies rather risking to reject a loan application of a client which might perform well than 
risking a default. Therefore, the rates of arrears and the loan write offs have always stayed 
extremely low in almost all of the MSE departments, no matter, how fast their loan portfolios 
were growing (Lepp/Terberger 2004).  
Turning to our results on outreach, the regression results are quite clear again. The variable 
VolumeDisbdSiz measures the gross increase in the size of the portfolio per loan officer in 
quarter one of 2004. The competition coefficient is positive and highly significant (regression 
7). This result implies that individual employee’s disbursement of loans increases in volume if 
local competition intensifies. Age  is highly significant, the sign of the coefficient being 
  19positive as well. Presumably, only experienced loan officers are capable of disbursing higher 
loan volumes. In contrary to our results on loan volume, we can find no impact of the 
competition variable or the age variables on the number of loans disbursed per loan officer 
(regression 8). Indirectly confirming our results on volume and number, we find a highly 
significant positive effect of local competition on the average size of disbursed loans. Thus if 
more competitors serve the local market on average the MSE branches provide clients with 
bigger loans (regression 9).  
In sum, Hypothesis 2 is partly rejected with respect to turnover-related indicators. 
Unexpectedly, competition goes along with an increase of the branches’ activity in terms of 
the volume of loans granted. This could be attributable to clustering effects in MSE lending 
which is an innovative business for banks in Kazakhstan. Branches might learn from their 
competitors and get motivated by their presence. Furthermore, the pure fact that several banks 
in the same location advertise MSE loans may give a boost in potential clients’ knowledge 
and trust increasing the pool of sound loan applications. These would be exactly the outreach 
effects which donors’ hope for when they make the promotion of competition an integral part 
of their institution building strategy.  
The volume effect of competition goes along with an increase in the average size of loans. 
This result confirms hypothesis 2 and probably would not be appreciated by donors who have 
a high priority on lending to the low-income group. Thus the impact of competition on 
outreach is ambiguous. On the one hand competition increases turnover-related indicators but 
on the other hand bigger single loan amounts suggest that competition shifts the business 
model towards bigger clients. Due to economies of scale bigger loans are cheaper for the 
branch. Our results might indicate that branches’ react to increased competitive pressure with 
bigger loans as an attempt to compensate for decreasing margins. 
Trying to evaluate this trade off which shows up in the different outreach dimensions one 
should come back to the objectives of KSBP. Explicitly, KSBP was designed as a program of 
financial market development by establishing the service of MSE lending and not as a 
program to directly fight poverty. Therefore, a trend to move up the market probably induced 
by competition should not outweigh the positive impact of competition on the supply of loans 
in terms of volume, as long as these loans supply finance for clients, which have viable 
investments and had no access to finance before. On the contrary, granting larger, more 
profitable loans might keep up the possibility to cross subsidize the service for smaller clients. 
Whether the partner banks of KSBP will be ready to do this, once donors have withdrawn, is a 
question that is beyond the scope of this paper. The impact of competition on the pool of 
  20clients receiving loans might become more prominent once donors influence and control will 
be absent.  
Without financial sustainability of the business, MSE lending will not be supplied in the 
Kazakh financial market on a permanent base. For a private commercial bank as a for-profit 
player, the criteria of financial sustainability is met if the scarce resources the bank is 
devoting to the MSE loan business earn the same (risk adjusted) rate of return which these 
resources could generate in any alternative business opportunity. Our results on profitability 
indicate that the rates of return are influenced negatively by competition. The question arises 
whether the rates are still sufficiently high to keep the business attractive, despite of 
competition. 
An IMF/Worldbank study reports declining interest rates on loans as well as declining 
margins due to increased competition (IMF/Worldbank 2004). Compared to the MSE 
business, however, the interest rate income on loans is considerably lower than the average 
interest rate income on the MSE portfolio of KSBP banks. For 2003 the study reports an 
interest rate received on loans of 13,05% on average, and of 12.47% for the three largest 
banks. According to our data set, the MSE portfolio generated an interest income on average 
portfolio volume of almost 5.5% in the first quarter of 2004 (see Table 1). Accordingly, the 
interest rate received per annum should be well over 20%. On the one hand, the relatively 
high gross interest income of the MSE portfolio could be influenced positively by the 
excellent portfolio quality. This conjecture is supported by the high rate of loan loss 
provisions of Kazakh banks. According to the report, provisions amount to 4.88% of deposits 
on average and 5.37% for the three largest banks in 2003. On the other hand MSE loans are 
usually more expensive than loans to medium and big enterprise to cover for the higher 
administrative cost per unit. On average, these additional costs could easily be covered by the 
interest rate income, as the return on the MSE portfolio indicates. The mean return on average 
outstanding portfolios of over 2.7% in the first quarter of 2004 (see Table 1) exceeds the 
return on assets of Kazakh banks for the whole year of 2003 which is reported as 1.98% on 
average and as 1.84% for the three largest banks. We have to take into consideration, 
however, that the total balance sheet of a bank does contain unproductive assets as well while 
the only asset assigned to our MSE departments is the productive loan portfolio. Furthermore, 
no overhead like a part of head office costs is assigned to the MSE departments when their 
return is calculated. Nevertheless, the MSE business on average seems to have not only 
passed the line of full financial sustainability, but is contributing considerably to the banks’ 
  21profits.
12 For the Kazakhstan case it seems justified to conclude: Competition shows a 
negative effect on profitability without endangering the financial sustainability on average. 
However, there exist other countries where the preconditions for establishing a financially 
sustainable MSE business might be less favourable than in Kazakhstan. In such contexts 
competition might have actually have adverse effects on programs promoting MSE finance. 
Furthermore, even in Kazakhstan, competition might have slowed down the process of 
reaching the brink of cost coverage, causing more subsidies to be spent than would have been 
necessary to develop the MSE loan market. 
 
6 Conclusions 
Based on a unique data set comprising cost and revenue figures of competing MSE banking 
units in Kazakhstan we analyzed the influence of competition on the success of an EBRD 
development project promoting MSE loan finance in the Kazakh commercial banking market. 
The main objectives of any program promoting MSE finance are twofold: MSE lending shall 
be established as a viable business whose survival in the market is not dependent on further 
subsidies (financial sustainability) and the outreach to the target group of micro and small 
enterprise shall be maximised.  
As the relationship lending technology is applied in MSE lending whose efficiency can be 
adversely affected by competition, we were surprised to find that competition, measured by 
the number of competing banks in a location, and lending activity were positively correlated 
in Kazakhstan without undermining repayment discipline. The outreach, measured by the 
volume of new loans disbursed, increased with competition while arrears were not affected. 
The latter presumably points to clustering effects in the MSE business which is innovative in 
the Kazakh financial market. The volume increase did not go along with an increase in the 
number of loans, however. The average single loan amount increased with competition, 
hinting at banks’ moving up the market. Furthermore, our results show a negative link 
between the degree of competition and the profitability of the MSE business, measured as the 
rate of return on the loan portfolio. Although for Kazakhstan it is not likely that competition 
has been a serious impediment to the financial sustainability of the MSE business, it can not 
be ruled out that competition in MSE lending may endanger the survival of the new business 
                                                           
12 It has to be mentioned, however, that there are rather big differences between the different MSE departments. 
The two departments, which were reporting losses were not included in our analysis due to methodological 
reasons, the least profitable department contained in Table 1 reports a return on average portfolio of just 0.15% 
for the first quarter of 2004. An analysis of why profitability varies is beyond the scope of this study. 
  22in a market altogether under less favourable conditions.  Thus, future research on the effect of 
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Table 1, Regression 1
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Dependent  variable:  InterestIncome
   
V a r i a e
Add Regression  Constant Age AgeSqr Ldensity Size NumberC Dummy  ID
 
Normality Heterosc. RESET Rsqr Par
  (Model 1) 
 
Coef.  -3.469 -0.002 0.000 0.065 0.009 -0.021 none [0.0003]**  [0.0002]** [0.7635] 0.165512 6











0.016            
Dummy Coef. -3.279 0.000 0.000 0.049 -0.005 -0.020 65, 82  [0.2240]  [0.4117] [0.6710] 0.402855 8
(Model 2) 
 











0.007            
Type Coef. -3.271 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.003 -0.023 65, 82  [0.1985]  [0.5582] [0.3494] 0.508697  12
(Model 3) 
 











0.001            
Type S  Coef.  -3.187 -0.001 0.000 0.038 0.003 -0.022 65, 82  [0.3984]  [0.5300] [0.4973] 0.475057  9
(Model 4) 
 











0.002            
Region Coef. -2.897 0.001 0.000 0.015 -0.001 -0.029 65, 82  [0.0354]*  [0.8146] [0.0897] 0.542073  24
(Model 5) 
 











0.001            
Region S  Coef.  -3.217 0.000 0.000 0.043 -0.005 -0.020 65, 82  [0.0789]  [0.5575] [0.6750] 0.438314 10
(Model 6) 
 











0.005            
Type+Region Coef. -3.074 0.002 0.000 0.027 0.006 -0.034 65, 82  [0.0184]*  [0.8648] [0.2127] 0.624556 28
(Model 7) 
 
t-ratio  -6.540 0.726 -1.510 0.642 0.924 -4.040            
p-value 0.000 0.470 0.136 0.523 0.358 0.000            
                         
       
 
Type+Region S  Coef.  -3.177 0.001 0.000 0.036 0.006 -0.033 65, 82  [0.5721]  [0.4157] [0.4396] 0.536372 12
(Model 8) 
 
t-ratio  -13.200 0.272 -1.220 1.540 0.887 -4.400            





Table 2, Regression 2
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Dependent Variable: CostPersonell 
   
                     
Variables  
Add Regression  Constant Age AgeSqr Ldensity Size NumberC Dummy  ID
 





Coef.  -3.071 -0.032 0.000 0.296 0.028 -0.009  [0.5470]  [0.0680] [0.2967] 0.447 6













t-ratio      No dummy ID
 
                 
p-value
 
Type Coef. -2.836 -0.037 0.000 0.266 0.028 -0.003  [0.5511]  [0.1577]  [0.8921] 0.550115 10
(Model 3) 
 











           
   
Type S  Coef.  -3.077 -0.032 0.000 0.290 0.014 -0.006  [0.3892]  [0.1564] [0.6098] 0.521 8
(Model 4) 
 











           
   
Region Coef. -1.256 -0.027 0.000 0.120 0.043 -0.035  15 [0.2363] [0.8874] [0.6192] 0.653 23
(Model 5) 
 











           
   
 
 
  27Region S  Coef.  -1.465 -0.031 0.000 0.146 0.033 -0.027  15 [0.9729]         
 
           
             
 
           
















         
   
Type+Region Coef. -1.760 -0.032 0.000 0.160 0.042 -0.026  15 [0.7577] [0.6761] 0.716 27
(Model 7) 
 









0.040            
   
Type+Region S  Coef.  -1.781 -0.030 0.000 0.023 -0.021  15 [0.8350] [0.9485] [0.5297] 0.625 10
(Model 8) 
 
t-ratio  -2.130 -4.570 2.110 1.250 -0.991            















Table 3, Regression 3  
1                     
                    
                      
 
     
       
              
                 
                        
                    
                      
           
   
              
                 
       
   
              
Dependent Variable: CostAdmin 
   
                   
Variables    
Add Regression  Constant Age AgeSqr Ldensity Size NumberC Dummy ID 
 
Normality  Heterosc.  RESET  Par 
























t-ratio        No dummy ID
 
               
p-value
 




























(Model 4)  t-ratio  -1.870 -5.670 2.710 2.240 0.404 1.210
p-value 0.064 0.000 0.008 0.027 0.687 0.228
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(Model 8)  t-ratio  -1.890 -6.200 2.760 2.360 1.750 -0.680





Table 4, Regression 4
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Dependent  variable: RoA
 
V a r l
Add Regression  Constant Age AgeSqr Ldensity Size NumberC Dummy  ID
 
Normality Heterosc. RESET Rsqr Par





















Dummy Coef. -1.335 0.039 0.000 0.406 -0.043 -0.123 15,62,82,103
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Coef. -0.712 0.035 0.000 0.333 0.027 -0.158 15,62,82,103






















Type S  Coef.  -0.924 0.035 0.000 0.381 -0.012 -0.140 15,62,82,103






















Region Coef. 1.149 0.047 -0.001 0.180 -0.033 -0.136 15,62,82,103






















Region S  Coef.  -2.164 0.041 0.000 0.479 -0.042 -0.113 15,62,82,103






















Type+Region Coef. 1.178 0.041 -0.001 0.147 0.037 -0.164 15,62,82,103






















Type+Region S  Coef.  -1.483 0.031 0.000 0.403 0.036 -0.138 15,62,82,103










(Model 8)  t-ratio  -0.848 2.150 -2.050 2.370 0.816 -3.000





Table 5, Regression 5
1                      
                    
                        
             
   
   
   
Dependent variable: OfficerProfitability 
   
                     
Variables
Add Regression  Constant Age AgeSqr Ldensity Size NumberC Dummy  ID
 
Normality Heterosc. RESET Rsqr Par
  (Model 1)  Coef.  5.909 0.079 -0.001 0.128 0.009 -0.072  [0.0006]**  [0.0599]  [0.0072]** 0.502147 6
t-ratio 3.650 5.830 -3.510 0.808 0.229 -1.630            
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.421 0.819 0.106            
  30                        
              
   
                   
               
   
                   
           
   
                   
               
   
                   
           
   
                   
               
   
                   
           
   
Dummy Coef. 6.582 0.062 0.000 0.092 0.024 -0.081 15,70,103 [0.5953] [0.0600] [0.0612] 0.657122 9









0.033            
Type Coef. 6.806 0.060 0.000 0.081 0.047 -0.093 15,70,103 [0.1453] [0.2407] [0.1227] 0.718523 13









0.012            
Type S  Coef.  6.959 0.058 0.000 0.069 0.043 -0.093 15,70,103 [0.1384] [0.1855] [0.1404] 0.716094 10









0.008            
Region Coef. 6.062 0.071 -0.001 0.147 -0.014 -0.018 15,70,103 [0.0571] [0.2218] [0.1333] 0.716681 25









0.712            
Region S  Coef.  5.682 0.063 -0.001 0.172 0.025 -0.070 15,70,103 [0.5589] [0.0670] [0.1411] 0.672268 10









0.063            
Type+Region Coef. 7.154 0.066 -0.001 0.052 0.007 -0.019 15,70,103 [0.0015]** [0.5566] [0.0117]* 0.775358 29









0.671            
Type+Region S  Coef.  6.132 0.060 0.000 0.142 0.043 -0.082 15,70,103 [0.0879] [0.2162] [0.1625] 0.728606 11
(Model 8)  t-ratio  4.540 5.670 -3.160 1.080 1.470 -2.410            









  31Table 6, Regression 6
1            
       
            
   
   
   
      
               
             
            
   
   
      
   
      
               
             
            
   
      
             
             
            
            
Dependent variable: Arrears 
 
    Logit regression 
   





Add Regression Constant Age AgeSqr Ldensity Size NumberC
(Model 1)  Coef.  -5.225 0.115 -0.002 0.042 0.333 0.116 






   
Dummy Coef.
(Model 2)  t-ratio             
p-value  
 
Type Coef. -5.948 0.167 -0.002 0.057 0.476 -0.008 






   
Type S  Coef.  -3.736 0.130 -0.002 -0.100 0.477 0.006 






   
Region Coef.
(Model 5)  t-ratio             
p-value  
 
Region S  Coef.  -9.845 0.118 -0.002 0.461 0.308 0.142 






   
Type+Region Coef.




  32Type+Region S  Coef.  -8.864 0.143 -0.002 0.350 0.453 0.036 
(Model 8)  t-ratio  -1.190 2.120 -2.100 0.499 2.590 0.199 





Table 7, Regression 7
1                     
                 
                    
 
 
   
   
              
              
   
              
              
   
              
          
   
              
              
   
              
          
   
Dependent variable: VolumeDisbdSize 
  
                   
   
   
Add Regression  Constant Age AgeSqr Ldensity NumberC  Dummy ID 
 
Normality  Heterosc.  RESET  Rsqr 
 
Par 
  (Model 1)  Coef.  10.499 0.024 0.000 0.006 0.051  [0.0551]  [0.7519]  [0.4634] 0.350035 5







           
   
Dummy Coef. 10.215 0.025 0.000 0.042 0.043 66,74,100 [0.5580] [0.9967] [0.4444] 0.511914 8







           
   
Type Coef. 10.237 0.024 0.000 0.052 0.044 66,74,100 [0.5567] [0.9965] [0.4011] 0.571597 12







           
   
Type S  Coef.  10.345 0.024 0.000 0.039 0.039 66,74,100 [0.4551] [0.9936] [0.4205] 0.567417 9







           
   
Region Coef. 9.155 0.037 0.000 0.130 0.074 66,74,100 [0.8782] [0.8383] [0.5413] 0.673941 24







           
   
Region S  Coef.  8.724 0.030 0.000 0.172 0.078 66,74,100 [0.7226] [0.9221] [0.0947] 0.627074 12
(Model 6)  t-ratio  9.760 4.100 -2.650 2.010 3.120            
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.047 0.002            
  33                    
              
   
              
                    
          
   
   
Type+Region Coef. 9.463 0.034 0.000 0.110 0.081 66,74,100 [0.5874] [0.8559] [0.9032] 0.731483 28







           
   
   
Type+Region S  Coef.  8.950 0.028 0.000 0.159 0.074 66,74,100 [0.5195] [0.9156] [0.1535] 0.673209 13
(Model 8)  t-ratio  10.600 4.100 -2.420 1.970 3.180            





Table 8, Regression 8
1                     
                 
                    
 
 
       
              
              
     [0.2022]    
    
              
              
       
   
              
              
         
   
              
              
                    
Dependent variable: NumberDisbdSize 
  
                   
   
   
Add Regression  Constant Age AgeSqr Ldensity NumberC Dummy ID 
 
Normality  Heterosc.  RESET  Rsqr 
 
Par 















     













     















     















     
   
  34Region S  Coef.  3.859 0.010 0.000 -0.092 -0.017        
   
              
              
         
     
              
              
       
   
















     













     









(Model 8)  t-ratio  3.920 1.100 -0.953 -0.981 -0.707





Table 9, Regression 9
1                      
                    
                        
               
 
 
   
            
                        
                    
                      
       
 
            
     
 
Dependent variable: ALoanSize 
   
                     
Add Regression Constant Age AgeSqr Ldensity Size NumberC Dummy  ID
 
Normality Heterosc. RESET Rsqr
 
Par
  (Model 1) 
 
Coef.  6.708 0.014 0.000 0.090 0.008 0.066  [0.8349]  [0.0829]  [0.3180] 0.393329 6

















t-ratio      No dummy
 
  ID                 
p-value
 
Type Coef. 6.776 0.017 0.000 0.083 -0.002 0.055  [0.5727]  [0.2687]  [0.5671] 0.418898  10
(Model 3) 
 













0.072            
Type S  Coef.  6.708 0.014 0.000 0.090 0.008 0.066  [0.8349]  [0.0829]  [0.3180] 0.393329 6
(Model 4) 
 
t-ratio  6.310 1.570 -0.123 0.868 0.339 2.280            
p-value 0.000 0.119 0.902 0.387 0.736 0.025            
  35  36
                        
       
 
            
   
 
            
       
 
            
   
 
Region Coef. 6.412 0.021 0.000 0.130 -0.018 0.084  [0.5144]  [0.0316]*  [0.8975] 0.647346  22
(Model 5) 
 













0.007            
Region S  Coef.  7.128 0.018 0.000 0.057 -0.008 0.088  [0.4018]  [0.0041]**  [0.6720] 0.570041  11
(Model 6) 
 













0.003            
Type+Region Coef. 6.920 0.025 0.000 0.086 -0.031 0.075  [0.4599]  [0.2299]  [0.9171] 0.666025  26
(Model 7) 
 













0.019            
Type+Region S  Coef.  7.128 0.018 0.000 0.057 -0.008 0.088  [0.4018]  [0.0041]**  [0.6720] 0.570041  11
(Model 8) 
 
t-ratio (HCSE)  9.166 2.440 -0.548 0.744 -0.403 2.960            





1 Model 1 explores the correlation between profitability measures and outreach indicators respectively and the number of competitors, controlling just for age, age squared, 
density, size. In model 2, we control for outliers by including a dummy for each of them. In model 3 the bank type is controlled for as well. Model 4 contains only significant 
type dummies. Region dummies are included in model 5 and 6 (6: only significant ones). Finally, we control for both type and region in model 7 and 8 (8: only significant 
ones). 